

Citizens Advisory Committee on Pipeline Safety  
Meeting Minutes Summary  
Location: WUTC - Olympia, WA  
**September 16, 2003**

**Present**

Shirley Olson (Chaired the September 16<sup>th</sup> meeting)

Duane Henderson

Grant Jensen

Pat Morgan (previously Bahor)

George Hills

Richard Kuprewicz

Ken Thomas

**Absent**

Chuck Mosher, Chair

Don Evans

Les Olson

**Agenda:**

1. Welcome and Adoption of July 15, 2003 Meeting Minutes
2. WUTC Pipeline Safety Section Update
3. Review and Discuss Draft Committee Status Report
4. State of Arizona (Kinder-Morgan) Pipeline Failure
5. Subcommittee Reports
6. Other Items of Business

**\*NOTE:** There was no public comments made during the September 16, 2003 Committee meeting.

1. **Welcome and Adoption of July 15, 2003 Meeting Minutes** – Acting Chairperson Shirley Olson welcomed everyone to the meeting of the State of Washington Citizens Committee on Pipeline Safety.
2. **WUTC Pipeline Safety Section Update** – Steve King, WUTC Director of Safety and Consumer Protection, updated the Committee on events occurring within the pipeline safety section.
  - Mr. King introduced Alan Rathbun as the Director of the WUTC Pipeline Safety Section. Alan is a long time state manager and holds a license as a professional engineer. He has extensive management, policy, legislative and rule-enforcement experience. He also has worked as a consulting engineer. For the past six years, Alan has been the Assistant Director of the Business and Professions Division at the Department of Licensing.
  - Next, Mr. King spoke about the status of Seattle/Olympic Pipeline dispute over safety of the line segment that runs to Harbor Island. Since the July committee meeting there have been the following developments in the dispute. An independent consultant hired by OPS

to review OPL's internal inspections of this line confirmed the company's identification of four locations on the line that required excavation and possible repair. OPL exposed, inspected and repaired three of four "anomalies" identified by internal inspections of the line. Special safety and permitting requirements apply to the final anomaly, which is located on Port property in a location identified as a hazardous materials waste site. U.S. District Court Judge Robert Lasnik issued a preliminary injunction blocking the city from shutting down the line. The city had demanded that OPL conduct a hydrotest on the line to demonstrate its safety or see the line shut down on August 26. The hearings on a permanent injunction have been scheduled for December 15. In early September, OPS and UTC staff conducted an integrity management inspection of Olympic's Seattle lateral. The purpose of this inspection was to address the concerns raised by the City about the adequacy of OPL's integrity management planning related to the Seattle line. The report of this inspection is still being compiled.

- Request for reappointment to the committee have been sent to the Governor for Shirley Olson, Duane Henderson, and Grant Jensen. Ed Ashbridge of Chevron has been nominated to fill the interstate liquids position. Thus far, approximately nine people have contacted the UTC wanting to be considered for the two vacant citizen slots on the Committee.
- WUTC Pipeline Safety staff is working on the second draft of the natural gas safety rules (WAC 490-93). These rules apply to all regulated distribution and transmission intrastate pipelines in the State of Washington. At this point, the schedule for the next phase looks like this:

1. The second draft will be mailed to interested parties shortly
2. Written comments will be due on October 17th
3. Workshop will be held on December 9th

After that WUTC expects to take the majority of the rules to CR-102, probably after the first of the year. The other rules, those that are more contentious will receive additional work with stakeholders.

At the December workshop we will devote time to discussing the need for rules addressed in Mr. Kuprewicz's study commissioned by the JLARC. JLARC had recommended that we consider rules on:

1. Management of change: Formulate regulations requiring appropriate management of change approval procedures within a pipeline company for any change of baseline design that is not replacement in kind.
2. Over-pressure reporting: Adopt regulations that require all pressures in excess of 110 percent of MOP/MAOP anywhere within a pipeline be reported to the UTC in a timely manner so proper mitigation can be assured to prevent reoccurrence.
3. Safety critical equipment: Foster regulations defining safety critical equipment and incorporating the concept of independency for such equipment in pipeline operations. The frequency of operation of safety critical over-pressure equipment should be reported at least annually.
4. SCADA computer monitoring: Adopt regulations requiring SCADA computer leak detection monitoring on transmission pipelines operating across HCAs.

5. Grandfathered anomalies: Compile a list by pipeline of all anomalies of concern that are grandfathered, but that would no longer be permitted in new pipeline operation.
6. Third party damage prevention: Adopt additional third-party damage prevention regulations exceeding the basic current one-call and public education efforts.
  - The WUTC hired the Frause Group to prepare a pipeline safety public information plan. The plan will identify the information people want to know about pipelines and pipeline safety, what organizations they trust and expect to deliver that information and whether these preferences vary by how close the citizens live to a pipeline. Frause recently completed its telephone survey of 900 Washington citizens. We will meet with them shortly to go over the results. We hope to be able to brief the committee on the findings from the research and the public information plan at its meeting in November.
  - On September 9th, the WUTC was contacted by the City of Bellevue expressing safety concerns about the status of the Olympic Pipeline that runs adjacent to Kamber Road. The city was reacting to a letter from Olympic to King County Wastewater Treatment Division about its plans to repair a sewer line in the vicinity of the OPL pipeline. In the fall of 2001, Olympic replace its line in the area and lowered it 15 feet in anticipation of other work to be done affecting the road and right of way. During the following year there was a fair amount of ground settlement that affected all underground facilities in the area. Beginning last December, OPL stabilized the ground in the area by injecting grout into the ground surrounding the pipeline to fill any voids under and around the pipe and help prevent any further settlement. OPL responded to the city on September 15th, stating the line is operating safely and offering to meet to work out a technical solution to the concerns raised in their letter to King County. The WUTC will be working with Bellevue, METRO, OPL and OPS to help them resolve this issue and to ensure the safety of the OPL line. A first meeting among the parties will be held on September 26th.
3. **Review and Discuss Draft Committee Status Report** – The committee reviewed and discussed the draft status report that will be distributed to the Governor, the Legislature and other interested parties. Committee member Rick Kuprewicz suggested adding information in the report on public right-to-know about pipelines. The committee decided to thoroughly read the report and give comments by e-mail to WUTC staff by Wednesday October 1<sup>st</sup>.
4. **State of Arizona (Kinder-Morgan) Pipeline Failure** – WUTC Senior Pipeline Safety Engineer, Kim West was asked to discuss the pipeline incident that occurred in Arizona that caused extremely high gasoline prices this summer. On July 30, 2003 a gasoline pipeline that transport fuel between the cities of Tucson and Phoenix ruptured. There were no injuries or deaths associated but substantial damage occurred when the pipeline failure spewed approximately 20,000 gallons of unleaded gasoline 50 feet into the air coating approximately six to seven unoccupied houses. About 10,000 gallons that was spilled was recovered. The accident occurred about 12 miles outside of Tucson near where a pump station is located. Resulting shortages in the Phoenix area drove gas prices as high as \$4 a gallon at some pump stations. The supply incident is under investigation by the U.S. Office of Pipeline

Safety, the Arizona Public Service Commission and the Governor of Arizona. The initial cause of the failure was identified as stress corrosion cracking on the pipeline however; the Arizona Public Service Commission has not completed the investigation. The failed pipeline was built in 1955 and is made of Pre 1970's ERW (low frequency, electric resistance welded). The failure occurred because of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) on the pipeline. SCC is often associated with poor or disbanded external pipe coating and certain soil conditions. This is an older pipeline and as such had poor coating. The pipeline has a coal tar/asphalt coating, in which approximately 30% was remaining on the exterior pipe wall. The pressure at the time of failure was approximately 1400 pounds per square inch gauge. Pipeline safety regulations came into effect in 1970. Typical of pipelines of this vintage, this pipeline did not have cathodic protection (corrosion protection) until after the regulations required the practice. In essence, this pipeline went without cathodic protection for over 20 years.

***If a failure like the Kinder Morgan Accident occurred in Washington, what is the normal process?***

Washington like Arizona is a state that has an agreement with the Office of Pipeline Safety to act as interstate agents. The incident, like the one that occurred in Arizona, would be reported to the national response center by the operator. The regional OPS office would be notified whenever there is a pipeline incident in the region. The federal office, the operator, or the state emergency office would notify the state office. The role of the state is to conduct an investigation into the cause of the incident and determine if any violations are involved.

Depending on the size of the incident, the NTSB may be the lead agency and the state would assist in that effort. The Western Region Director would issue any compliance action such as a Corrective Action Order (CAO), or a hazardous facility order that would require the pipeline to be shut down or restarted with special restrictions. Normally the Western Region Director would work with the State to issue a CAO to begin the investigation process. Often not all information needed to determine the status of a pipeline system is immediately known, therefore a request for additional information from an operator is often made so decisions about the type of action(s) that would be necessary can be completed. This usually results in original CAOs being amended. The State would continue with the investigation and submit a final report that designates the cause of the incident, the facts of the case, and suggested violations of the Code of Federal Regulations.

***Could what happen in Arizona occur in Washington?***

The answer is not likely to occur in Washington State.

Washington

Different than Arizona, Washington receives its fuel directly from two refineries in the northwest portion of the state. There are two pipelines that deliver fuel from the refineries, the 20-inch and 16-inch Olympic pipelines to Renton. A 14-inch fuel pipeline

delivers the fuel south to Portland. In addition to the Olympic system, the Chevron pipeline delivers fuel north to Spokane through the Pasco Terminal.

### Arizona

The gas shortage that occurred in Arizona was based on perceived volume loss and panic by consumers at the pump stations. The large diameter pipeline from California continued to deliver fuel throughout the “shortage.” Arizona would not have suffered a shortage if consumers purchased fuel at the previous consumption rate. What consumers did was to panic and at all times top off their tanks in the event of a shortage.

As a result of the Kinder Morgan pipeline incident, the Arizona Governor is looking into incentives to bring refineries/additional pipelines to Arizona.

### Natural Gas

This type of accident is not likely to have a similar result with natural gas. As long as the system is not abused, the Williams pipeline system has redundancy. Two parallel 26-inch and 30-inch pipelines transport natural gas south from Sumas, south to the Oregon border. With the recent construction projects, Williams has added capacity and flexibility to their system. In addition, PG&E delivers fuel to Washington.

5. **Subcommittee Reports** – The subcommittees met and then gave reports about their current activities.

### **Damage Prevention**

No report at the September meeting.

### **Governmental Input and Monitoring**

Grant Jensen, George Hills, Rick Kuprewicz

- Committee member Rick Kuprewicz informed everyone that the federal natural gas integrity management rulemaking has slowed the process down to allow additional input from the public and industry. The subcommittee is still reviewing the rulemaking material and would rather have a reasonable rule, rather than a rushed rule.

### **Pipeline Public Awareness**

Shirley Olson, Pat Morgan

- The subcommittee expressed an interest in meeting with the Frause Group (see item number one above for more information on the Frause Group initiative) to learn about their findings. The subcommittee members stressed that the focus of their subcommittee depends on the feedback and outcomes of the Frause Group and would like to be kept in the communications loop. The subcommittee would like to assist the Frause Group in being an resource for pipeline public outreach.
- Plan to attend the City/County Consortium Conference in November and set up an information table at the meeting.

- As a follow-up from the July 15<sup>th</sup> meeting, the Pipeline Public Awareness subcommittee stated that there was no need to send a letter to the Mayor of Seattle in regards to the Olympic Pipeline issue.

**6. Other Items of Business -**

Katie Hansen, with the Washington State City/County Consortium, notified the committee of a conference that the consortium plans to hold on November 13, 2003. The conference will be held at the Meydenbauer Center and will bring together local governments, regulators and pipeline operators to discuss pipeline safety issues. Committee member Grant Jensen gave an update to the committee on the status of the Williams Gas Pipeline Lake Tapps incident, which occurred May 1, 2003. Mr. Jensen stated that the corrective action order from OPS is still in affect, with the company operating the Sumas to Washougal segment of natural gas pipeline at 80 percent operating pressure, per the corrective action order.

Williams is conducting several tests to find out if there are any more anomalies on the pipeline.

- Hired an independent third-party company to conduct leak surveys with an ionization detector. Only one leak was found on a flange at a meter system. The gasket was replaced to correct the leak.
- Another test with a transverse flux inspection tool (TFI), which determines if there are cracks along the longitudinal seam of the pipe.
- Magnetic flux leakage tool (MFL) was also used to determine wall loss on the pipe.
- An Ultrascan crack detection tools was run using a liquid medium (water). A company named PII, which is a subsidiary of GE, is currently reviewing the data. Digging up and exposing selected anomalies on the pipeline will be conducted October – December 2003.

The meeting of the Citizens Committee on Pipeline Safety adjourned at 1:10 p.m.